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2  Some Debt History 
Prior  to  the  Great  Depression,  Argentina  was  one  of  the  ten  wealthiest 
countries in the world.'  In this chapter we will review, from the perspective 
of external debt, the growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
and the subsequent decline that begins with the depression and World War  I1 
and extends to the present. We  will only discuss the latter period in broad 
terms,  although  it  must  be  understood  that  the  Peronist  experience  of 
1946-55  and the Frondizi years of  1959-62  have fundamental importance for 
the structure and performance of Argentina even today. Episodes such as the 
attempt at modernization under Frondizi or the Krieger-Vasena stabilization of 
1967-69  remain important events in Argentine economic history. 
2.1  Debt and Long-Run Growth 
In general terms, when did the economy of Argentina move ahead or fall 
behind? Table 2.1 shows a comparison of average growth rates of per capita 
income for several broad periods. 
Argentina became a significant country in world trade around the turn of 
the century. By  1912 Argentina accounted for 5.5  percent of British imports 
from  the  main  trading  countries,  4.2 percent  of  German  imports,  and  4 
percent of  French imports. The strong growth in real per capita income and 
in  exports was rooted  in  the development of  an export-based  agricultural 
economy. By  1913 exports accounted for 40 percent of GDP.2 
The  period  of  decline  clearly  began  in  the  1930s.  The  collapse  of 
commodity prices and the trade restrictions implied stagnation in per capita 
income. In 1939 per capita GDP was still at the level of  1928, and the same 
was true,  after intermittent fluctuations, in  1945. The period from  1945 to 
1974 had growth rates of per capita income equal on average to 1.9 percent. 
Since then, per capita income has been falling at 1.4  percent per year. Thus, 
even  though  inflation  and  external  balance  performance  has  often  been 
troublesome  and  growth  performance  falls  far  short  of  that  in  Korea  or 
Brazil, the extreme difficulties stem from events of the past fifteen years. 
Table 2.1  Average Rer  Capita Growth (percent per year) 
Period  Argentina  Australia  Brazil  Canada  U.S. 
1870- I9 I3  1.9  0.6  n.a.  2.0  2.0 
1900/04-1925/29  1.8  0.8  1.2  1.2  1.3 
1925129- 1935139  -0.3  0.3  1  .o  -0.9  -0.2 
1935139- 1980184  1.3  2.6  3.3  3.2  2.3 
Sources:  Cavallo (1986), Maddison (1982), and Elias (1987) 
n.a.  = not available. 55  Argentidchapter 2 
2.2  The Late Nineteenth Century 
Argentine economic development in  the nineteenth century was financed 
by  borrowing in the world capital market. Peters (1934) reviews the history 
of  Argentine debt in  this period and documents the waves of  lending and 
subsequent defaults. His estimates place debt in  1879-80  at 300 percent of 
GDP and at 360 percent in  1890-91.  Speaking of the 1890s, Peters notes, 
“Within  a decade exports had doubled, imports had tripled, and debt had 
quadrupled. In no single year was there a budget surplus”  (35). Hyndman 
([1892] 1967, 153-54)  writes of  this period: 
Buenos Ayres surpassed every other city in its luxury, extravagance, and 
wholesale  squandering of  wealth.  There  was  literally  no  limit  to  the 
excesses of  the wealthier classes. While money, luxuries,  and material 
poured in on  the one hand,  crowds of  immigrants from Italy and other 
countries flocked in  to perpetuate the prosperity of the new Eldorado of 
the South. Railways, docks,  tramways, water-works, gas-works, public 
building, mansions, all were being carried on at once in hot haste. 
Debt service difficulties developed into a full-fledged debt crisis in  1890, 
spreading far beyond Argentina. Table 2.2 shows data on trade, the budget, 
and borrowing. Until 1890 large rates of capital inflow financed trade deficits 
and debt service. Ford  ([1962] 1983, 140-41)  observes: 
By  1890 this borrowing of 708 million gold pesos between 1885 and  1890 
had increased the annual debt service charges to 60 million gold pesos (or 
60 percent of export proceeds in  1890-a  very heavy charge) of which the 
public  sector’s  share  amounted  to  28  million  gold  pesos.  . . . It  is 
important to note  that  because of  the nature of  these loans the annual 
Table 2.2 
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Sources:  Ford ([I9621 1983) and Schaefer (1922). 
Note: Foreign borrowing is calculated  by date of  debt issue. 
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service charges incurred had a hard core contractually fixed and payable in 
gold or sterling. Once the flow of loans ceased, thereby diminishing foreign 
currency receipts,  . . . these service charges would remain. . . . Thus as 
the boom progressed service charge payments formed a growing portion of 
foreign  currency  payments  and  remained  more  intractable,  once  loans 
diminished and incomes fell, than imports. It is not surprising then to find 
the public debt service repudiated in 1891, and a moratorium arranged until 
1987, for the government would have had to add to the depressive forces to 
raise the necessary funds-an  action politically impossible. 
In  fact,  Argentina’s  failure  to  service  its  debt  brought  down  Baring 
Brothers, the English banking house.3 The initial debt rescheduling with the 
receivers  of  Baring  Brothers  (called  the  Rothschild  Committee)  was 
negotiated  in  1890.  Williams  (1920,  125-28)  notes  two  points  of  the 
deliberations that are highly relevant to present-day discussions. One is the 
insistence of the Argentine representative that “if the government had to buy 
bills of exchange in Europe, the premium on gold would probably go up so 
very  considerably, which  would  make  living standards unbearable, except 
for the richer classes, and might even cause revolution.”  The other notable 
point concerns differences of opinion within the committee. The German and 
French members wanted to make a temporary loan to Argentina, believing 
that the country might shortly be in a position to resume payments, “but the 
English members refused to accede to this, for they thought it probable that 
at the end of  six months the Argentine government would be in exactly the 
same position as at present. The foreign representatives then withdrew from 
the committee.” 
The initial agreement reached provided for a new bond issue to provide 
the means for debt service over the following three years. In return for this 
loan the government undertook to cancel (through budget surpluses) at least 
15 million pesos each year. But, again quoting from Williams (1920, 127): 
The authors of  it [the restructuring] had underestimated the gravity of the 
crisis, supposing that the temporary relief afforded by  the loan would be 
sufficient to enable the government to assume the full burden of its foreign 
liabilities in 1894-a  burden that would be augmented by  the addition of 
the interest on the funding bonds to the previous obligations. The Funding 
Loan was  at best  a palliative,  conceived in the spirit of  the old  policy 
which had  brought Argentina to financial collapse,  the policy of  paying 
the interest on old loans with new ones. 
Further debt service difficulties, however, led to a large rescheduling in 
1893.  Interest  on  the  three  principal  long-term  loans  was  reduced  for  a 
five-year period  from  5-6  percent  to  only  1 percent.  The  bond  holders 
committee also agreed,  in the  so-called Romero Settlement, to a simulta- 
neous reduction of interest payments to only 60 percent of the stated coupon 
rate for the same five-year period on all other debts. Full debt service was to 
resume  in  defined  stages between  1897 and  1901.  As  Peters  (1934, 47) 57  ArgentindChapter 2 
notes,  “the  arrangement  was  highly  successful;  interest  payments  were 
resumed in full a year before the stipulated time, and Argentine bonds rose 
to high quotations almost immediately, indicating small loss of  prestige.” 
The very rapid pace of immigration and the accompanying large inflow of 
capital stabilized debts per capita and strengthened the balance of payments. 
By  1899 the currency was stabilized in the Tomquist reform with a return to 
the gold standard. Argentina entered the twentieth century with a clean slate. 
2.3  The Great Depression 
The  sharp decline  in  commodity prices  in  1921 brought  renewed  debt 
service problems  for  Argentina.  Wheat  prices  fell  by  nearly  50 percent. 
The terms  of  trade which  had  been  exceptionally favorable during World 
War I deteriorated by  nearly 40 percent during  1925-31.  The debt service 
problems did not last long.  Recovery of  the terms of trade and a wave of 
new  lending,  this  time  from  the  United  States,  masked  the  payments 
problems. 
The price of Argentine bonds which traded in the 90s at the end of the war 
fell to only 70 in  1920-21,  but by  1923 a recovery of  confidence helped 
push up the price. By  1926-28  full confidence was restored and Argentina 
was  borrowing  extensively.  Peters  (1934,  167)  reports  that  net  capital 
inflows from all  sources averaged more than  100 million dollars per year 
between 1923 and 1930, or about 10 percent of the public external debt. 
Figure 2.1 shows net exports (in the GDP accounts) as a fraction of GDP 
and  figure  2.2  shows the  ratio  of  external public debt  to  GDP.  Wartime 
surpluses  and  inflation  helped  reduce  the  debt  ratio.  Even  with  postwar 
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Fig. 2.2  Public external debt (percentage of exports) 
deflation and the deficits, the 1930 ratio of debt to GDP was no higher than 
that prevailing on the eve of World War I.4 
The 1928-33  period for Argentina represented an entirely traditional debt 
crisis: an adverse external shock coupled with a suspension of capital flows 
and trade restrictions.  Kindleberger (1984, 317) notes that 
Latin America was hit-especially  Argentina,  Brazil  and Colombia-by 
the  abrupt  halt  in  foreign  lending  in  June  1928  when  the  New  York 
market  started  its meteoric  rise  and  interest rates  tightened  on  the  call 
money market. On this score a number of  Latin American countries date 
the start of the Depression from the second half of  1928. . . . Whatever 
the  merits  of  U.S. bankers  in  pushing  foreign  lending  from  1925 to 
1928, they  were  surely  at fault in  cutting it off  abruptly  in June of  the 
latter  year.  Deflation  is  imposed  by  the  Center  on  the  Periphery, 
whenever  the  former  suddenly  stops lending,  as in  1825,  1857,  1866, 
1873,  1890 and  1907. First  halting lending and then  cutting way  down 
on imports is a recipe for disaster. 
Table 2.3 shows key macroeconomic variables during the late 1920s and the 
depression years.5 Note first that the terms of trade and exports peak in  1928 
and then suffer a dramatic decline. Real GDP reaches its lowest level in 1932, 
with a 13.5 percent decline. Just like Brazil, Argentina came out of the crisis 
rapidly and by 1938 had an output level 23.6 percent above the previous peak. 
Maddison  (1985)  has  compared  the  performance  of  various  countries 
during  the  Great  Depression.  Some of  his  conclusions are summarized  in 
table 2.4. First, note that the experience of  Argentina is not very different 
from that of  other Latin American countries with respect  to the decline in 
output, the export loss, and the decline in the purchasing power of exports. 
In order to complete the comparison, the change in the real value of  debt 59  ArgentindChapter 2 
Table 2.3  Argentina During the Great Depression 




























































































Sources: Vazquez-Presedo (1971) and €studios  (no. 39, July-September  1986). 
”Index, real GDP. 
bIndex, real agricultural GDP. 
‘Index  of  the GDP deflator. 
dThe series was estimated from data in €studios (1986). 
ePublic external debt, in millions of  $U.S. 
‘Merchandise exports, in millions of $U.S. 
Table 2.4  Comparative Performance in the Great Depression 
Pea!-to-Trough  Decline (%)  External Shock” 
Export  Import  Purchasing  Power 
GDP  Volume  Volume  of  Exports  1929-32  1932-37 
Argentina  -13.8  -35.8  -53.2  -41.9  -9.3  18.1 
Latin America  -17.3  -40.0  -64.8  -53.7  -11.1  11.7 
Asia  -6.4  -22.4  -30.0  -31.8  0.1  5.6 
Industrial countries  -  13.0  -37.5  -27.1  -  30.  I 
Source:  Maddison (1985, tables 4, 6, and 7). 
“The external  shock  is  defined  as the  real  income loss  from  export  volume  and  terms of  trade  changes 
measured as a percentage of  base year real GDP. 
service would  have to be  added. Since Argentina  had  a very  high ratio of 
debt to GDP, this factor might have made Argentina’s experience appear to 
be particularly  striking. 
The external shock measure represents a calculation of the real income as 
opposed to the GDP cost of the external shock. An adjustment is made for 
the  reduced  purchasing  power  of  exports as well  as their  volume  decline. 
The interesting point here is that while the initial loss was extremely large, 
so was the recovery. The base years for the decline and recovery are not the 
same, but an adjustment for this point would reduce the gain in 1932-37  to 
15.7 percent.  Thus on balance there was an exceptionally  strong recovery. 60  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
The reason for this is that partly as a result of several years of drought during 
the  1930s in the United States, Argentina experienced a major terms of trade 
improvement after 1933. 
Argentina’s  response  to  the  crisis,  the  terms  of  trade  improvement 
notwithstanding,  differs  from  that  of  other  Latin  American  countries, 
notably Brazil.  The Brazilian decline  in real  income  in  1929-32  averaged 
only 0.4 percent  versus  4.8 for Argentina;  Brazil’s  recovery  in  1932-37 
averaged  7.5 percent  per  year  versus  5.2 in  Argentina.  Active  domestic 
industrialization policy  using import substitution explains Brazil’s  superior 
performance  because  on the  external  side Brazil fared  worse  in  1932-37. 
Whereas  Argentina  in  1932-37  gained  18.2  percent  in  real  income  as a 
result of external forces, Brazil gained only 3.1 percent. 
However,  there  was  another  important  difference:  Argentina  faithfully 
continued debt service throughout  the  period  of  adverse  shock; Brazil,  by 
contrast, declared a moratorium and ultimately wrote down its obligations in 
1943. Figure 2.3 shows the price of Argentine debt in the New York market. 
Until 1930 there was no sign of the impending crisis. Then, with the collapse 
of  exports  and  widespread  default  by  European  and  Latin  American 
countries, the price of the debt fell to less than $50 per $100 face value. But 
with  the  sharp  rise  in  wheat  prices-they  doubled  between  1931  and 
1937-debt  returned to near par and held steady until the outbreak of World 
war 11. 
Unlike  virtually  all  other  Latin  American  countries,  Argentina  did  not 
suspend debt service in the 1930~.~  Countries like Brazil relied on domestic 
industrialization and sacrificed debt service to gain the necessary room in the 
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Fig. 2.3  The Argentine bond price in New York  (price per $100 face value) 61  ArgentindChapter  2 
at least there was a vigorous attempt to stem the depression by  fiscal policy. 
This was not the case in Argentina. Carlos Diaz Alejandro (1984, 33) writes 
explicitly  about  the tradeoff  in Argentina between  debt  service and  fiscal 
policies to fight recession: 
The counter-cyclical  potency of Argentine fiscal policy during the  1930s 
was reduced by the increased  share in total expenditures of debt-service 
payments,  largely made to foreigners.  All  payments on  the public debt 
reached  29%  of  expenditures  in  1932; this  may  be  compared  with  a 
meagre 5% devoted to public works. 
In  Argentina  a  conservative  government  favored  the  interests  of  the 
cattle  industry.  The  government  won  the  continuation  of  access  to  the 
British market by granting privileged  exchange rate and tariff treatment of 
British goods and by  pledging  continued debt service.  Abreu  (1984,  158) 
summarizes  the  policy  of  the  1930s,  embodied  in  the  Roca-Runciman 
Agreement of  1933, in the following terms: 
Argentina’s  foreign  economic  policy  in  the  1930s was  defined  under 
the heavy constraints placed  by  British  bilateralism.  Given the political 
basis  of  the  Concordancia,  Argentine  concessions tended  to  assume  a 
shape  which  distinctly  favored  cattle  interests  to  the  detriment  of  the 
national  interest.  This  policy  had  costs  in  the  long  run  in  terms  of  a 
slower  growth  of  the  economy-and  particularly  of  industry-than 
would have been the case had it made less concessions towards British 
interests. 
O’Connell  (1984,  204)  comments  in  particular  on  the  conservative 
influence on policy. He writes that internationalism was a reflection of the 
favorable  experience  and  the  prosperity  won  in  the  past.  That favorable 
experience in turn justified  maintenance  of that posture during a period  of 
adversity: 
Insistence  on  maintaining  the  service  of  the  external  debt  even  when 
confronted  with  outright  suggestions  of  suspension  by  the  British 
authorities-in  the  context  of  the  Anglo-Argentine  Agreement negotia- 
tions of  1933-looks  like a clear indication that such a set of ideas went 
beyond any external determination. 
2.4  The Postwar Period through 1976 
From figure 2.3 it was clear that Argentine bonds were trading near par by 
World War 11. The improvement in the terms of trade at the end of the 1930s 
and the large trade surplus accumulated during the war, which is strikingly 
apparent from figure 2.1, gave Argentina the means to retire its external debt 
and to buy from an impoverished Britain its direct investment in Argentina, 
in particular the railroads. Blocked sterling deposits of  the BCRA with the 
Bank of  England were the means with which the purchases were financed. 62  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
Thus, by the late  1940s Argentina’s bonded  public  external  debt had been 
very substantially reduced. 
The pace  of  redemption  and  the  purchase  of  the  railroads  was  too fast, 
however,  and debt problems were  again  apparent  by  1950. This time they 
concerned  short-term credits. A  refunding  loan  of  $125  million  from the 
Export-Import  (Ex-Im)  Bank  helped  pay  off  the  arrears  due  American 
creditors.  Most  external  borrowing  in  the  195Os,  apart  from  short-term 
trade credit, took the form of lending by the Ex-Im Bank and by the World 
Bank. 
By  1955 the  bonded  public  external  debt  of  Argentina  stood  at  $575 
million.  The  next  refunding  operation  occurred  in  1956,  following  the 
overthrow of  the  Peronist  regime. At  this time, Argentina joined the IMF 
and had its first Paris Club rescheduling of official debts. By  1962 debt had 
risen  to $2.6 billion  with  an additional  $1  billion  in  unguaranteed  private 
debt.’  Table 2.5 shows the very low ratio of public external debt service in 
the  early  1950s  and  the  rapid  buildup,  particularly  in  the  form  of 
amortization, toward the late  1950s. 
Further rescheduling  of  debts  occurred  in  1962-63  and again  in  1965. 
The 1962-63  rescheduling involved public sector principal payments, with a 
stretching  of  maturities  into the  late  1960s. But  the rescheduling  was not 
sufficient,  so that  in  1965 principal  payments  due in  the  five-year period 
following  1968 had to be refunded. 
In the late  1960s, following  the refunding  agreement of  1965, there was 
a  shift  in  financing  from  suppliers’  credits  and  official  agencies  to  the 
international capital market.  Borrowing in the world capital market allowed 
the automatic rolling  over of  maturing  principal  payments. Funding  crises 
of  the 1950s and early 1960s had arisen from an inability to pay  principal, 
which  created  a  need  to  reschedule  these  payments.  The  world  bond 
market made it possible to roll over these payments  apparently indefinitely. 
Thus any increase  in the debthncome ratio could be kept to low levels, as 
shown in figure 2.4. The external surpluses shown earlier  in  figure  1.4 on 
average paid at least part of  the interest. 
From the vantage point of  1970, this is how Bittermann  (1973, 117-21) 
viewed the Argentine debt situation: 
Table 2.5  Ratio of  Public Debt Service to Exports (in percentages) 
Period  Ratio  Period  Ratio  Period  Ratio 
1926-29  9.3  1957  7.4  I960  23.5 
1930-33  24.6  1958  12.5  1961  26.1 
1953-56  2.0  1959  16.0  1962  22.8 
Source:  Avramovic (1966, 46) 63  ArgentindChapter 2 
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Fig. 2.4  The ratio of debt to GDP (percent) 
The  outstanding  public  and  private  external  debt,  requiring  heavy 
amortization  in  1970,  will  constitute  a  crucial  problem  for  the  next 
few years. Obligations under the earlier refundings have been met and are 
scheduled to be paid off by  1972. . . . Without  a renewal of bank loans 
and  other  credits,  the  contractual  payment  of  the  Argentine  economy 
would be over a billion in  1970, compared with exports of  $1.8 billion. 
In sum, the solvency of the Argentine economy depends on its ability to 
renew  banking  credits  and  issue securities.  The formal refunding  credits 
will have been paid off in 1972, but there will be continued service on the 
debt which has replaced them. 
Why  was  there  no  debt  crisis  until  the  early  1980s?  The  primary 
explanation  is that  automatic  rollover  meant  that as long as creditors were 
confident, the external debt basically had no set maturity and no limit! From 
1970 to  1975 public  and  private  external debt  each  doubled.  New  loans 
financed old loans. One might have thought  that the Peronist experience of 
1973-76  would  have  made  operation  in  international  capital  markets 
difficult.  But  reserves  were  high  and initially  the world  commodity boom 
made for very large trade  surpluses. A massive current  account  deficit  did 
emerge in  1975, but that was also the last year of the Peronist regime. The 
policies under Martinez de Hoz, which we will discuss in the next chapter, 
brought the economy rapidly around to muster unprecedented rates of capital 
inflow.  By  the  late  1970s the  vulnerability  of  the  economy  to  external 
payments  difficulties  and, especially,  to a halt  of  foreign  lending, was  far 
removed  from daily experience and memory.  The stage was thus set for a 
major debt crisis. 